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To what extent can a traditionally competitive relationship with Greece be moderated, against a background of successive Balkan crises? Turkey may be a pivotal state in Western perception, but uncertainties in transatlantic relations may make the very concept of the "West" unclear as seen from Ankara. Above all, Turkey faces daunting political, economic, and social pressures, with implications for the vigor and direction of the country's foreign and security policies. The range of possibilities is now quite wide, from a more globalized Turkey, more closely integrated in Europe and the West, with a multilateral approach toward key regions, to a more inward-looking and nationalistic Turkey, pursuing a more constrained or unilateral set of regional policies.
This book seeks to describe the challenges and opportunities facing Turkey in the international environment at a time of extraordinary flux and offers some conclusions about the country's future. The analysis should be of interest to policymakers and observers in Turkey, in the West, and elsewhere and contribute to informed debate about the country's role. The volume builds on a substantial body of RAND work on Turkey and related topics undertaken over the last decade. This study extends and updates this tradition of analysis. In addition to exploring the internal and regional dimensions of Turkish foreign policy, we have given special emphasis 
TURKEY AS A REGIONAL ACTOR
In the past decade, moreover, Turkey has emerged as an increasingly important regional actor, wielding substantial military as well as diplomatic weight. Nowhere has this been more evident than in the Middle East. This growing involvement in Middle Eastern affairs represents an important shift in Turkish policy. Under Atatürk-and for several decades after his death-Turkey eschewed involvement in the Middle East, but in recent years, Turkey has been heavily engaged in the region. This more active policy contrasts markedly with the more passive approach that characterized Turkish policy before the Gulf War.
At the same time, Turkey's greater involvement in the Middle East has complicated relations with Europe. Many Europeans are wary of Turkish membership in the EU not only because of the political, economic, and cultural problems it would present but also because they fear it will extend Europe's borders into the Middle East and drag Europe more deeply into the vortex of Middle Eastern politics. Thus, Turkey's Middle Eastern involvement has raised new dilemmas about its European or Western identity. The deeper its involvement in the Middle East, the more problems this poses for Turkey's Western orientation and identity.
The end of the Cold War has also opened up new horizons for Turkish policy in the Caucasus and Central Asia-areas that were previously closed to Turkish policy. Although Turkey has been cautious about exploiting these possibilities, the emergence of the Caucasus and Central Asia has given a new dimension to Turkish policy. Turkey now has interests in the region that it did not have during the Cold War. This inevitably affects its security perceptions and relations with its Western allies.
Summary xi
At the same time, Turkey's interest and involvement in the Caucasus and Central Asia have complicated relations with Russia and given the historical rivalry between the two countries new impetus. Increasingly, Russia has come to see Turkey as a major rival for influence in the region and has sought to stem Turkey's efforts to establish a geostrategic foothold there. But Russia also remains an increasingly important trade partner. This gives Turkey a strong incentive to keep relations with Russia on an even keel. Indeed, the growing economic interaction between Russia and Turkey is one of the most important developments in Turkish policy toward Eurasia and could have a significant effect on Turkey's relations with Moscow over the long run.
Turkey's relations with Europe are also undergoing important and stressful change. At its December 1999 Helsinki summit, the EU decided to accept Turkey as a candidate for membership, after years of keeping it at arm's length. Since then, Turkey has undertaken a number of important reforms designed to meet the EU's Copenhagen criteria, including abolition of the death penalty and an easing of restrictions on the use of the Kurdish language. However, many Europeans are still not convinced that Turkey should be admitted, both for cultural as well as economic reasons; their reservations are compounded by the sheer scale of Turkey as a society.
Perhaps the area where Turkey's relations have witnessed the most dramatic change, however, is with Greece. After years of hostility, Greek-Turkish relations have slowly begun to improve, bolstered in part by "earthquake diplomacy." The key question, however, is whether the recent rapprochement simply represents a tactical maneuver or fundamental strategic change in the nature of relations. So far, the thaw has been limited largely to nonstrategic areas such as trade, the environment, tourism, and a variety of nontraditional security matters. However, if it is to be durable, it will need to address the core issues of the Aegean and Cyprus.
In the Balkans, too, Turkish policy is in flux. 
THE TRANSNATIONAL DIMENSION
Turkey's interests and policy are also shaped by a number of crosscutting transnational-and transregional-issues, especially the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the proliferation of ballistic missile technology. Turkey's increased exposure to WMD is bound to influence its security perceptions in the future. At the same time, this exposure gives Turkey a much stronger interest in missile defense than many of its European allies, which do not (yet) face the same degree of vulnerability to these threats.
Terrorism is another transnational issue having a significant effect on Turkish security perceptions. The number of assassinations of prominent Turkish officials and journalists in the last decade, and Summary xiii the persistence of left-wing and right-wing terrorism inside Turkey, have heightened Turkish sensitivity to the dangers of international terrorism and given Ankara a strong interest in combating its spread. This could become an issue in Turkey's relations with the United States, especially if some of Turkey's neighbors, or groups within Turkey, were to begin to conduct terrorist attacks against Turkish bases from which U.S. forces were operating.
Energy has also emerged as an important factor influencing Turkish policy. Turkey's growing energy needs have given Turkey a strong interest in developing ties to energy-producing states in the Middle East and the Caspian region. Turkey's strong support for the development of the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline has become a critical element in its strategy in the Caucasus and Caspian region. Turkey has also sought to expand economic cooperation with Iran in the energy field despite strong U.S. objections. And it has been eager to revive energy cooperation with Iraq and see the current sanctions regime against Baghdad lifted. With the development of new oil and gas routes to bring Caspian and Middle Eastern supplies to world markets, Turkey is also emerging as a key energy entrepôt and transshipment state, especially for Europe.
Finally, Turkish policy has been affected by the increased emphasis on human rights in Western policy. The Kurdish issue, in particular, has been a source of tension in Turkey's relations with Europe, especially Germany. But human rights concerns have also had an important effect on relations with the United States. Concerns in this area have had a substantial influence on the character of the bilateral relationship in recent years, including security cooperation and arms transfers.
INTERNAL CHANGE
These changes are occurring at a time when the Turkish domestic scene is also experiencing important changes, many of which are having an effect on Turkey's foreign and security policy. In the last decade, many of the key tenets of Atatürkism-Westernization, statism, secularism, and nonintervention-have come under increasing assault. The democratization of Turkish society has created space for a variety of new groups and forces that have challenged the power of the Kemalist state. These challenges, including challenges xiv Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age of Uncertainty from Turkey's secular reformists to the traditionally strong state apparatus, will be a key force shaping Turkish society and policy over the next decades.
In addition, the Islamist movement in Turkey has undergone an important evolution in the last several years. The dominant tendency among Turkey's religious politicians today-many operating under legal bans on political activity-is toward what is described as "Muslim democracy," loosely patterned on the model of Christian democratic parties in Europe. The foreign policy orientation of these Muslim democrats appears increasingly mainstream but reflects a degree of wariness regarding globalization and integration and can be nationalistic in tone.
Indeed, the reassertion of Turkish nationalism is arguably a far more important influence on foreign policy than religious politics in Turkey. Although nationalism has been a key component of Turkish foreign policy going back to Atatürk, the Gulf War gave it new impetus. Many Turks felt that Turkey paid too high an economic and political price for its support of the United States in the Gulf War. Moreover, these sacrifices did not bring the expected rewards, namely, membership in the European Union. The tepid European response provoked considerable resentment among the Turkish public and reinforced a sense that Turkey had to look after its own interests more vigorously. Events in Bosnia and Chechnya, where Turkish affinities are engaged, reinforced this nationalist inclination. In a very different fashion, Turkey's current economic crisis-and resentment over the role of international financial institutions-has also been a spur to nationalist sentiment.
Another important trend has been the growing influence of the independent media, especially television. The media played an important role in the crisis over Imia/Kardak, which brought Turkey and Greece to the brink of war in January 1996, as well as in the first Chechnya crisis. Moreover, Islamist and other political groups now have their own television stations, giving them unprecedented access to a much broader cross section of the Turkish public. Public opinion and the media are now far more important factors in Turkish external policy than ever before.
Summary xv
At the same time, the growth of a dynamic private sector has served to weaken the role of the "strong state" and strengthen the power of civil society. The business community, in particular, has emerged as an important political force in Turkey. The Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association and other institutions have emerged as outspoken advocates for reform and have proposed new policy initiatives on a broad range of social, economic, and political issues, including the Kurdish issue. Turkish entrepreneurs have also played a leading role in the expansion of economic ties to Russia, Central Asia, and the Middle East and have been at the forefront of the recent rapprochement with Greece. Together with the changing role of the military in Turkish society, the landscape for debate and policymaking on a range of issues, including foreign and security policy, is changing rapidly, with new actors operating alongside traditional elites.
Finally, the role of the Turkish military is evolving. The military has traditionally regarded itself as the custodian of the Atatürk legacy and has directly intervened three times when it felt democracy in Turkey was threatened. Each time, however, it has returned to the barracks after a short period of direct rule. Today, the military is much less inclined to intervene directly in Turkish politics. But it remains an important political force behind the scenes, as its ouster of the Erbakan government in a "silent coup" on June 1997 underscores. This political role is regarded by many EU members as inconsistent with a modern democracy and could pose an obstacle to Turkey's membership in the EU over the long term.
In sum, Turkey today is at an important crossroads. Externally, it faces new challenges, especially in Europe and the Middle East; internally, it has reached an impasse that requires important changes in the way Turkey is governed-and by whom. Incrementalism and "muddling through"-approaches that have characterized Turkish policy in the past-are unlikely to be sufficient in the future. The threshold for unrest in Turkey remains high, but a continuing economic crisis, with social and political cleavages left unresolved, could push Turkey toward greater instability, making extreme or more chaotic outcomes possible. Although far from inevitable, these outcomes would have serious implications for Turkey's external relations. In particular, a Turkey in turmoil would result in even more resistance to the idea of Turkish membership in the EU. Turkey
